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LAW DAY 2050: POST-PROFESSIONALISM, MORAL
LEADERSHIP, AND THE LAW-AS-BUSINESS PARADIGM
RUSSELL G. PEARCE*
Inspired by Ted Schneyer’s future history of professional disci-
pline1 and Bob Gordon’s description of “the hazy aspirational world”
of the “Law Day Sermon,”2 I offer a vision of the legal profession’s
next fifty years in the form of a Law Day speech from the year 2050.
Looking back on developments in the first half of the twenty-first
century, this piece explores the implications of the analysis proposed
in my earlier article, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Dis-
carding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputa-
tion of the Bar.3 The speech presents a projection of the moral leader-
ship the bar could achieve if it were to embrace the law as a business
paradigm.
As we celebrate Law Day in the year 2050, we can be proud of the
bar’s achievements during the past fifty years. Looking back from this
point, it is hard to believe that lawyers were once held in low esteem by
the public4 and that, as a community, lawyers failed to provide moral
leadership to society.5 I have decided to take this opportunity to review
the evolution of the bar and the legal system in the twenty-first century.
                                                                                                                                                
* Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law and Director of the Stein Cen-
ter for Ethics and Public Interest Law. I am grateful for the comments of the presenters and a t-
tendees at the Florida State University College of Law conference: “Defining and Refining Pro-
fessionalism: Assessing the Roles and Regulations of Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century.”
Special thanks to Ted Schneyer for his generous assi stance. I am grateful as well for helpful
comments from Jesse Choper, Hanoch Dagan, Mary Daly, Katherine Franke, Bob Gordon,
Bruce Green, Abner Greene, Geoff Hazard, Tom Morgan, Joey Pa rnes, Carroll Seron, Tom
Shaffer, Lloyd Weinreb, Ben Zipursky, Richard Zitrin and research assistant Seunghee Cha.
1. See  Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REV.
125 (1991).
2. See  Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988).
Gordon suggests that the “Law Day Sermon” leaves “ordinary life far behind for the hazy aspi-
rational world . . . inspirational, boozily solemn, anything but real.” Id. at 13.
3. Russell G. Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995).
4. See, for example, The Harris Poll, Jan. 7-12, 1999, ranking law firms last of fourteen
institutions with only fourteen percent of the public expressing “a great deal of confidence” in
them. The Polling Report, Inc., Confidence/Trust in Institutions (visited June 8, 1999),
<http://www.pollingreport.com/institut.html>. See also Poll: Doctor is Most Prestig ious Job ,
UPI, June 17, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File (recognizing that 23% of the
public identifies lawyers as having “very great prestige” as opposed to 61% for doctors, 55% for
scientists, 53% for teachers, 46% for clergy, and 41% for police officers); Stephen Budiansky et
al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP ., Jan. 30, 1995, at 50-51 (showing
that 56% of the public believes lawyers “use the system to protect the powerful and enrich
themselves”); Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NAT’L L.J. , Aug. 9, 1993, at 22
(noting that poll shows the most-cited reason for a negative view of lawyers was that “lawyers
are too interested in money”).
5. See  supra note 4; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A N ATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE
CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); S OL M.
LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, T HE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
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Today, as in the twentieth century, the market for legal services di-
vides roughly into two segments: one for businesses and wealthy indi-
viduals, the other for low- and middle-income persons.6 The major pro-
viders of legal services to businesses and wealthy individuals are the “Big
11” global, multidisciplinary, professional services firms that provide
“one-stop shopping” to their clients. In addition to legal services, these
firms provide other services—primarily financial, consulting, and ac-
counting. Some began as accounting firms, others as banks or invest-
ment banks. As they expanded into the delivery of legal services, they
acquired law firms or built their own practices. Among the “Big 11,” only
Holland & Knight began as a law firm. While firms exclusively offering
legal services have not disappeared entirely, only a few, such as Cravath
& Wachtel,7 remain.
Today’s situation would not have been totally unfamiliar to lawyers at
the turn of the century. By that time, the “Big 5” accounting firms had
become significant legal service providers in Europe and were beginning
to play a major role in the delivery of legal services in the United States.8
Financial services companies were looking to broaden their businesses,9
and many lawyers were adopting an entrepreneurial approach to their
work.10
These trends accelerated in the twenty-first century and helped create
the political climate which led first to a de facto and later a de jure  abo-
lition of the prohibitions of legal practice by nonlawyers—the “unau-
thorized practice”11 restrictions. While some in the organized bar fiercely
                                                                                                                                                
6. This formulation is a modification of Heinz and Laumann’s division of legal practice
into two hemispheres: representation of large organizations and representation of individuals.
See  J OHN P. HEINZ AND EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
THE BAR 127 (rev. ed. 1994). Even Heinz and Laumann concede that representation of some
wealthy individuals might fit within the organizational hemisphere. See  id.  at 128; see also  John
P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyer’s Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 751, 775 (1998) (“Lawyers employed by large firms do, of course, handle legal work
for individuals—often for the individuals who are officers of their corporate clients.”).
7. This firm resulted from the early twenty-first century merger of Cravath, Swaine &
Moore with Wachtel, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.
8. See, e.g., Philip S. Anderson, We All Must Be Accountable, A.B.A. J. , Oct. 1998, at 6
(noting that the “Big 5” accounting firms “began acquiring or developing law firms in Europe
and Australia,” that two of them “have announced they intend to become the world’s largest law
firms by the turn of the century or shortly thereafter,” and that four of the top five “employers
of the most lawyers” are “accounting firms”); Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The
Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Part-
nership, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2000); John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play , A.B.A. J.,  Feb.
1998, at 42, 44 (observing that “all the major accounting firms have significant legal practices
throughout Europe [and] . . . that the European movement is beginning to wash up on U.S.
shores”); David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Interna -
tionalization of Legal Fields and the Crea tion of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. R ES. L.
REV. 407, 434-35 (1994) (describing how the accounting firms developed a significant position
in the European legal services market).
9. See  Daly, supra note 8.
10. See  Pearce, supra note 3, at 1250-53; CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING
LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL FIRM ATTORNEYS  17-18 (1996) (providing examples
of solo and small firm lawyers).
11. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitu tional
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-44 (1981)
(providing an overview of unauthorized practice restrictions).
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resisted these developments,12 others advocated a compromising ap-
proach13 and a few considered permitting nonlawyers to offer legal serv-
ices, as well as to manage and invest in organizations providing legal
services.14 More and more prominent lawyers joined professional serv-
ices firms.15 The pressure from accounting firms, banks, and investment
banks continued to increase. Big business clients added their voices in
support of these efforts. They wanted the maximum freedom to choose
their own legal services providers. 16 If these pressures were not enough,
the fate of the unauthorized practice prohibition was finally sealed when
the World Trade Organization found the restrictions to be an unjustified
restraint on international competition.17
Joining the fight against the unauthorized practice rules was an un-
likely ally of big business—the consumer movement. Consumer advo-
cates were infuriated that low and moderate income consumers of legal
services had continued to face high prices in a restricted market while de
facto abolition of the unauthorized practice prohibitions opened the
market serving wealthy individuals and businesses. The consumer
movement’s position was consistent with its long opposition to the legal
                                                                                                                                                
12. See, e.g. , ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Written Remarks of Lawrence J.
Fox: You’ve Got the Soul of the Profession in Your Hands (visited June 16, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/fox1.html> (describing the author’s “nightmare” of attending “the
annual meeting of the National Association of Multi-disciplinary Professional Firms”); ABA
Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Appendix C: Reporter’s Notes (visited June 8, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdappendixc.html> (noting unauthorized practice complaints
filed against “Big 5” accounting firms in Texas and Virginia).
13. See  ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, American Bar Association Commis-
sion on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House of Delegates: Recommendation (visited
June 8, 1998) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html> (recommending that
lawyers be able to establish multidisciplinary practices within the framework of the existing
ethics rules and prohibitions on non-lawyer practice of law).
14. See, e.g. , Edward S. Adams and John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A
Proposal for Non-Lawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40 (1998) (argu ing for
repeal of “prohibitions against non-lawyer investment in law firms and association with non-
lawyers”); Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has
the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 H ASTINGS L. J. 577, 604-05 (1989) (arguing in favor of
multidisciplinary practice and for repeal of unauthorized practice prohibitions); Pearce, supra
note 3, at 1265-76 (arguing in f avor of permitting nonlawyers to practice law); Deborah L.
Rhode, Meet Needs With Nonlaywers: It Is Time To Accept Lay Practitioners—and Regulate
Them, A.B.A. J. , Jan. 1996, at 104.
15. This trend began in the twentieth century. See, e.g., Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Spe-
cial Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments , WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
1998, at A1 (observing that “[m]ore high-profile tax lawyers are leaving lucrative law-firm part-
nerships to join ‘Big 5’ accounting firms”); Elizabeth MacDonald, Accounting Firms Hire Law-
yers And Other Attorneys Cry Foul, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at B8 (“Accounting firms are
hiring lots of legal eagles, making law firms nervous about protecting their turf.”).
16. See  Attorneys—Multidisciplinary Practice: ACCA Backs Multidisciplinary Concept
Allowing Lawyers to Join with Nonlawyers, 67 U.S. L. W KLY. 2499, 2500 (1999). The Amer i-
can Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA), a national bar association for in-house corporate
counsel, stated that it “supports a broad range of choice for clients to select from service pro-
viders capable of formulating comprehensive solutions which address not only the legal aspect
of their problems, but various other facets as well.” Id.
17. See , e.g., Mara M. Burr, Will the General Agreement on Trade in Services Result in
International Standards for Lawyers and Access to the World Market? , 20 HAMLINE L. R EV.
667 (1997); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of
Looking at the Differences in Perception Between U.S. and Foreign Codes of Lawyer Conduct ,
32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT ’ L L. (forthcoming 1999) (anticipating World Trade Organization’s con -
sideration of legal services).
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profession’s monopoly on the ground that lawyers maintained the mo-
nopoly for their own interests, not those of the public,18 and that the dis-
ciplinary system was underfinanced, ineffective, and biased toward pro-
tecting lawyers.19
As the leaders of the consumer movement correctly anticipated, the
end of the prohibition of non-lawyer practice caused a revolution in the
delivery of services to low- and moderate-income individuals and small
businesses. Comprehensive plans offered by Legal Maintenance Organi-
zations, or LMOs, became common parts of employee benefit packages,20
as well as viable options for individual consumers who could afford
them.21 For those who only wished to make an occasional purchase of
common services, such as wills, real estate closings, and no-fault di-
vorces, H&R Block, American Express and Merrill Lynch, among others,
have developed inexpensive, standardized methods for making reason-
able quality services available at a low cost. New publications aid the
consumer by rating legal service providers. For-profit legal referral
services offer more personalized advice on selecting appropriate serv-
ices. 22
Some of these developments contributed to a decline in the price of
litigation services. This decline was smaller than that for transactional
services, because some restrictions on delivering litigation services re-
main.
The courts established three tiers of practitioners that remain in ef-
fect today. The top tier consists of members of the bar, who can appear
before all courts. Those in the middle tier are “advocates” who have
completed an undergraduate law degree (common in most countries
other than the United States in the twentieth century)23 or a special one-
year training course and are generally permitted to appear in trial courts
but not in appellate forums. The third tier is for “aides” who have com-
pleted only a two-month long course. Their practice is restricted to ad-
ministrative proceedings, uncontested court proceedings like no-fault
                                                                                                                                                
18. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Written Remarks of James C.
Turner Submitted to the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited June 16, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/turner1.html>. James C. Turner, The Executive Director of
HALT, Inc.—An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform, quireied whether the bar’s en -
forcement of unauthorized practic restrictions was “lawyers defending their economic turf.” Id.
19. See, e.g. , HALT, Inc.—An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform, HALT’s Legal
Reform Agenda (last modified August 8, 1998) <http://www.halt.org/INFO/reform-
agenda.html> (critiquing lawyer discipline).
20. See  Schneyer, supra note 1, at 126 (discussing LMOs); Stephanie Armour, Latest
Workplace Perk: A Lawyer, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 1999, at A1 (noting that “[t]ens of thousands
of employees . . . are finding a new workplace benefit: access to legal services”).
21. Consumers have found, though, that LMOs, like HMOs (Health Maintenance Organi-
zations), make services more affordable, in part, by limiting the consumer’s control of the deliv-
ery of services.
22. Most jurisdictions barred the latter in the late twentieth century. See, e.g., CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS  774 (1986) (describing how rules limit referral services to
non-profit organizations or bar-affiliated groups.
23. See  Daly, supra note 8, at 12 (observing that “law is an undergraduate area of study in
almost all the countries of the world”).
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divorces, and courts of limited jurisdiction, like Housing Court, where
nonlawyers have traditionally provided assistance to parties.24
The addition of the second and third tiers has provided consumers
with more choices and more affordable services than were available in
the twentieth century. Other developments have also made those litiga-
tion services more affordable. Widespread use of videoconference court
appearances,25 streamlined discovery practice, and the greater use of al-
ternative dispute resolution, reduced the time and expense of litigation.
The extension of the contingent fee to criminal and family law cases
made counsel of choice more affordable in those areas.26 Unfortunately,
although prices have been reduced considerably and access has in-
creased greatly since the turn of the century, some litigation services re-
main unaffordable to moderate- and low-income consumers.
In light of all of these developments, the employment of lawyers has
changed dramatically. While most lawyers work for the “Big 11,” LMOs,
or legal service providers like H&R Block, a few are part of lawyer-owned
boutique practices, usually in litigation. A few small or solo practices ex-
ist for those consumers who would rather shop in their neighborhoods
or obtain the personalized service of a small business, even at a higher
cost.
These changes in practice helped transform legal education to make
available a much wider variety of opportunities. Colleges offer an under-
graduate law degree that permits graduates to practice as advocates.27
While some law schools refuse to offer any curriculum other than for a
Juris Doctor degree, others also offer a year-long course for advocates
and a two-month course for aides.28 Students can choose to attend law
school classes in person, through the internet,29 or by some combination
of the two.
The regulation of lawyers has also undergone major changes. In the
twenty-first century, a consensus developed that state regulation of law
practice was inappropriate and impractical. State regulators had never
been able to obtain adequate funding or develop effective enforcement
programs. Perhaps more important, they could not provide the uni-
                                                                                                                                                
24. Interestingly, this system of multiple tier legal service providers, including nonlawyers
offering transactional services, resembles the situation in Europe at the turn of the century
more closely than it resembles that in the United States. See, e.g. , Daly, supra note 8 (describ-
ing how European legal systems tended to establish a d ivided profession “and permit non law-
yers to offer legal advice”).
25. For an early example of videoconferencing, see Mark Hamblett, Video Bridges Two
Countries in Livent Bankruptcy Hearing, N.Y. L.J., June 7, 1999, at 1 (describing “the first vid -
eoconference hearing between a bankruptcy judge in the United States and one in a foreign
country”).
26. See , e.g., Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498 (1991) (arguing for permitting contingent fees in criminal representa-
tion); Laura W. Morgan, If It Walks Like a Duck, and Talks Like a Duck . . . : Contingency Fees
and Results Bonuses in Divorce Practice, DIVORCE LITIG., July 1998, at 138 (arguing for per-
mitting contingent fees in divorce practice).
27. Such an opportunity was available abroad far earlier. See  Daly, supra note 8.
28. For an early critique of a “unitary bar” and unified legal education in the United
States, see ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 416-20 (1921).
29. For a discussion of some early developments in use of the internet for legal education,
see William B. Bulkeley, Kaplan Plans a Law School Via the Web, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1998,
at B1.
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formity of rules and enforcement necessary to a market for legal services
that was increasingly national and international in scope.30 Although
firms providing services to businesses and wealthy individuals had long
provided assistance across state and national boundaries, the advent of
the “Big 11” meant that virtually all providers in the elite market were
global in scope. The development of LMOs and the delivery of services
through retail chains also made the market for low- and middle-income
persons a national one. Thirty years ago, Congress addressed these
changes by establishing the National Disciplinary Commission for Law-
yers and Allied Professions (NDCLAP)31 to regulate legal services provid-
ers.
NDCLAP’s Federal Code of Ethics 32 [hereinafter Federal Code] gen-
erally resembles the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility [herein-
after Model Rules] and Model Code of Professional Conduct [hereinafter
Model Code] of the late twentieth century. The Federal Code diverges
significantly from these codes in three areas. First, the Federal Code is
significantly more protective of consumers. For example, it requires
written retainers explaining the terms and conditions of the representa-
tion, including the determination of the cost of services and the client’s
option to file a complaint with NDCLAP.33 The Federal Code similarly
requires all legal service providers to have mandatory malpractice insur-
                                                                                                                                                
30. See  Schneyer, supra note 1, at 127. See  Debra Baker, New Push for Going Mobile:
European-style Cross-border Practices May Be the Next Big Wave Here, A.B.A. J., July 1999,
at 18 (noting that “a French advocate can represent clients in German courts, yet New York
lawyers can’t cross the Hudson River to give advice on the issuance of government bonds in
New Jersey without risking jail time”). In the late twentieth century, some support existed for
federal regulation of the legal profession. See , e.g. , Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Eth -
ics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994) (describing arguments in favor of federal regulation). Others
urged the introduction of federal regulation into practice in the federal courts. See , e.g., Bruce
A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and
How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996); Committee on Profes-
sional Responsibility, Uniform Ethics Rules in Federal Court: Jurisdictional Issues in Profes-
sional Regulation , 50 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 842 (1995). Even advocates of state regulation
conceded the tremendous difficulty it posed for multijurisdictional practice and advocated ma-
jor reforms. See,  e.g., Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice-
Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, An Answer, or No Answer At All?, 36 S. T EX. L. R EV. 715, 798
(1995) (acknowledging that the “movement toward consolidation and multijurisdictional prac-
tice” and the “national” nature of the economy had created a “dilemma . . . in multijurisdic-
tional practice”); Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjuris-
dictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. T EXAS L. REV. 665, 701, 713
(1995) (arguing that “lawyers and their interstate clients should be free to approach interstate
legal matters without concern for undesirable and artificial restrictions imposed by state lines,”
but rejecting federalization of lawyer regulation).
31. Schneyer, supra  note 1, at 125.
32. See  id.  at 127 (predicting a “Federal Code of Lawyering”).
33. Compare these provisions with ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Rule 1.5(b) (recommending, but not requiring, written fee agreements for clients “not regularly
represented”) and ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-19 (recommend-
ing, but not requiring, written fee agreements). See Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How the
Proposed Final Draft of the “Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers” Fails to Protect Un-
sophisticated Consumers in Fee Agreements with Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. L EGAL ETHICS  581
(1997) (criticizing prevailing standards for failing to protect consumers adequately and urging
rule changes to provide consumers with information they need and to penalize harshly those
lawyers who violate a consumer’s rights).
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ance.34 Second, the Federal Code requires legal services providers to dis-
close information necessary to prevent the commission of criminal, ille-
gal or fraudulent acts “that the lawyer reasonably believes [will] likely . . .
result in death, or substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to . . . fi-
nancial interest or property.”35 Third, following the trend toward relax-
ing the conflicts rules which started in the late twentieth century, the
Federal Code makes all conflicts personal, but requires strict screening
procedures to ensure confidentiality and loyalty within a firm.36
In enforcing the Federal Code, NDCLAP has a wide range of sanc-
tions available. It can fine individuals or organizations or prohibit them
from providing legal services and publishes notices informing the public
of disciplinary proceedings, which are open to the public. Instead of
waiting for consumer complaints, as was generally the practice under the
prior regime of state discipline, NDCLAP pro-actively conducts random
audits. For example, a recent audit of “redacted client billings at the
Phoenix office of [one of the “Big 11” identified] . . . eight instances of
‘churning’ or presumptive overbilling”37 and three instances of inade-
quate conflict screens.38 The “Big 11” firm agreed to make restitution and
pay a modest fine along with publication of these sanctions.39 As a result
of an internal investigation, the “Big 11” firm disciplined the lawyers and
other employees responsible, decided to modify its minimum billing
policy, and revised its screening policy.40 This regime of federal enforce-
ment, together with increased competition, has resulted in a dramatic
increase in the quality of legal services.
While all of these changes increased the quality and affordability of
legal services, they would not have necessarily led lawyers to a position
of moral and political leadership. The catalyst for this development was
the bar’s embrace of the idea that law practice was a business and rejec-
tion of professionalism’s dichotomy between a self-interested business
and an altruistic profession. This transition, however, was not an easy
one. The ideology of professionalism had served lawyers well since its in-
ception in the late nineteenth century.41 At that time, lawyers and mem-
                                                                                                                                                
34. See, e.g., Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Profes-
sors, 70 TUL. L. R EV. 2583, 2623-24 (1996) (arguing in favor of mandatory malpractice insur-
ance).
35. N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1998). The language of the Fed-
eral Code , based on the New Jersey rule, departed from the general standard at the turn of the
century which did not require disclosure of client wrongdoing and indeed only permitted it “to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” MODEL RuLES Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1995).
36. See , e.g., Neil W. Hamilton & Kevin R. Coan, Are We a Profession or Merely a Busi-
ness?: The Erosion of the Conflicts Rules Through the Increased Use of Ethical Walls, 27
HOFSTRA L. REV. 57 (1998) (describing and opposing trend toward undermining imputed dis-
qualification of entire firm through increasing acceptance of screens); Wisdom of Ethics 2000
Panel’s Draft on Modifications to Rule 1.10 is Examined, 67 U.S. L. WKLY. 2766, 2767. (Chair
of ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professionalism “advocates screening to cure dis-
qualification, as is provided for under the Restatement of Law Govern ing Lawyers”). See id.




41. See  Pearce, supra note 3, at 1238 (describing history and identifying basic elements of
professionalism as “esoteric knowledge, altruism, and autonomy”).
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bers of the public complained that the practice of law had become a
business.42 Elite lawyers’ assertion of a republican vision of lawyering
grounded in the faith that lawyers, unlike business people, were above
self-interest appeared contrary to fact.43
Professionalism emerged to rescue the dichotomy between a business
and a profession, and to expand lawyers’ autonomy through the enact-
ment of the unauthorized practice laws. Like the republican perspective,
professionalism claimed that lawyers worked primarily for the common
good and not for profit.44 Unlike the republican perspective, profession-
alism conceded that flawed lawyers existed in significant numbers and
that the invisible hand of reputation, while important, alone was insuffi-
cient to police the bar.45 Professionalism’s contribution was the proposi-
tion that self-regulation through the development of a code of ethics and
control of bar membership through admission requirements and unau-
thorized practice prohibitions would accomplish this goal and weed out
the bad apples.46
Despite occasional crises, the Professionalism Paradigm persisted
throughout the twentieth century, but eventually the bar and the public
again came to question whether lawyers were inherently more altruistic
than business people. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,47 the U. S. Su-
preme Court observed that “the belief that lawyers are somehow ‘above’
trade has become an anachronism.” 48 A few years later, Chief Justice
Burger declared the profession in crisis as a result of creeping commer-
cialism.49 During the following decades, leading scholars, judges, and bar
leaders joined him in declaring the profession “lost,” “betrayed,” or near
“death.”50 The public echoed these sentiments. It viewed lawyers as basi-
cally out for their own interests and the interests of the rich and power-
ful.51
In response, leaders of the profession vainly tried to save the para-
digm. They made speeches and wrote books and articles attacking busi-
ness behavior by lawyers, exhorting them to return to an ethic of profes-
                                                                                                                                                
42. See  Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and Prac-
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48. Id. at 371.
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sionalism.52 They created Professionalism Commissions and required
professionalism courses.53 They sought to increase lawyers’ pro bono
contributions.54 None of these efforts had much of an impact. Most law-
yers—like most of the public—rejected the view that lawyers were above
self-interest, and, consequently, they viewed appeals based on profes-
sionalism to be hypocritical, silly, or irrelevant to their increasingly
business-like work lives.55 The public reputation of lawyers continued to
decline.56
Nevertheless, the bar could have persisted. If it had, just imagine
what we would have today. I suspect that if the organized bar had con-
tinued to cling to professionalism, its role today would be to serve as a
narrowly self-interested labor organization. One would imagine that its
primary goal would be to gain and protect work rules guaranteeing that
only lawyers could hold supervisory positions in the legal services de-
partments of professional services firms. The bar’s claims of profession-
alism would have continued to ring hollow. The public would have con-
tinued to hold the organized bar in low esteem.
Fortunately, this was not the road we took. For us, the turning point
came soon after the demise of the unauthorized practice prohibitions
when we acknowledged (albeit somewhat belatedly) that we had entered
into the era of post-professionalism.57 More and more members of the
bar conceded that the paradigm of professionalism was no longer per-
suasive.58 Instead of clinging to the idea that they were morally superior
to nonlawyers, growing numbers of lawyers embraced the notion that
the practice of law was a business.59 What had been a contradiction un-
der professionalism—that purportedly altruistic lawyers sought to make
as much money as they could—became a truism.60 Lawyers were like
other people. Their self-interest was very important to them. But so was
the public good.
When a significant majority of lawyers discarded the professionalism
paradigm, the bar faced the challenge of finding a way to motivate law-
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yers to accept a commitment to the common good. The first step the bar
undertook was an introspective one. It recognized that professionalism
advocates were correct in observing a decline in lawyers’ commitment to
the public good. In 1964, Erwin Smigel’s renowned study of Wall Street
lawyers found that they primarily identified themselves as guardians of
society.61 Just twenty years later, the situation was entirely different.
Studies of lawyers at large firms revealed that most understood them-
selves largely as hired guns and not as guardians of society.62 This per-
spective extended throughout the bar. Contrary to professionalism’s
commitment to the common good, the standard conception of lawyers’
role had become extreme partisanship on behalf of clients and moral
non-accountability in pursuit of clients’ goals. 63
In formulating a plan to restore a commitment to the common good,
the bar sought to understand why this commitment had diminished.
Professionalism advocates had ascribed this shift to lawyers’ increasing
business behavior and the bar’s increased diversity, which undermined
the ability of a largely heterogeneous, white, Protestant elite to perpetu-
ate the ethos of noblesse oblige  professionalism.64 In the post-
professionalism era, the bar found these arguments unpersuasive. A new
self-awareness of the bar’s history revealed that in previous periods the
business-profession dichotomy had survived the challenges of business
behavior65 and increases in diversity.66
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Instead, the twenty-first century bar found that lawyers’ decline in
commitment to the common good mirrored a change in societal con-
sciousness. The second half of the twentieth century saw a shift through-
out society away from a sense of obligation to the community and toward
the individualistic pursuit of self-interested goals. 67 Lawyers were unable
to insulate themselves from this trend. They moved from a vision of
themselves as guardians of society who also represented clients to the
belief that they were hired guns concerned with promoting their clients’
self-interest.68
Further fueling this development was the growth in the late twentieth
century of public interest law as a freestanding field of practice and the
related campaigns to increase pro bono efforts. 69 While the earlier Wall
Street lawyer, who viewed himself as the guardian of society, confronted
the tension between the client’s interest and the common good, the
growth of public interest and pro bono permitted his successors to divide
their client interests from their public duties. Elite lawyers could serve as
hired guns for their corporate clients, and yet maintain their good
standing in the professionalism world by expressing their commitment
to public service through pro bono work separate from, and marginal to,
the bulk of their practice.70
With this new understanding of the decline in commitment to the
common good, the twenty-first century bar sought to restore it. In this
effort, the bar had four distinct advantages over professionalism advo-
cates. The first advantage was removal of the burden of professionalism.
This meant both that the organized bar need not try to sell an unpersua-
sive ideology and that it could dispense with jeremiads against business
behavior. Leaving the fight against commercialism behind, the bar’s
message was simple: commitment to the common good.
The second advantage was the pressure of competition from nonlaw-
yers. As a matter of self-interest, the bar needed to distinguish itself.
Simply put, promoting the common good through strenuous individual
and organized efforts was good public relations for members of the bar
(which was far more necessary than when lawyers had no competition
from nonlawyers). Similarly, self-policing was no longer the unfulfilled
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aspiration of a monopoly. It had become essential to creating a positive
“brand name.”
The third advantage was that viewing and maintaining law practice as
a business demanded moral accountability. Under the ideology of pro-
fessionalism, lawyers had the autonomy to create their own role moral-
ity. In the late twentieth century, lawyers filled that role with extreme
partisanship and moral non-accountability.71 The end of professionalism
meant the end of autonomy and therefore moral non-accountability.
Lawyers had no choice but to accept that they were accountable for their
actions just like everyone else.72 Acceptance of moral responsibility did
not result in abandonment of loyalty to clients. But, much as our repub-
lican forebears and Smigel’s Wall Street lawyers, the bar viewed this ob-
ligation in the context of lawyers’ larger obligation to the common good.
Moral accountability became an important concern for individual law-
yers and the organized bar. In addition to holding each other to moral
standards, lawyers were able to engage in constructive dialogue about
their work with members of the public who, unlike lawyers, had for a
long time considered lawyers morally accountable for their actions.
For a fourth advantage, accepting law practice as a business placed a
burden on lawyers to demonstrate their commitment to the common
good. Professionalism had simply assumed that the community of law-
yers would promote the common good and thereby earn the public’s re-
spect. In contrast, being part of a business placed lawyers on the same
footing as other occupations. If lawyers wanted respect for moral leader-
ship, they would have to earn it.
With all these advantages, the bar found the common good a much
easier sell. Like others in society, lawyers were searching for meaning in
their work beyond making money.73 Discarding the aspiration of moral
non-accountability, they engaged the rich potential to make a positive
difference for their clients, for those involved with their clients, and for
society as a whole. After years of dialogue, lawyers reached a consensus
on a moral vision of their role as business persons with responsibility for
the administration of justice. This shared commitment has enabled the
bar to become a model of a moral, responsible business community.
Lawyers’ moral leadership, together with other changes in practice,
transformed lawyers’ public image. The public has appreciated lawyers’
commitment to the common good, as well as the many positive changes
in the market and in regulation that have made the delivery of legal
services and the legal system far more consumer friendly and affordable.
Now that clients have the choice of retaining lawyers or nonlawyers, they
choose lawyers only when they believe lawyers will provide better quality
services at a better price. One result of this change is that business ex-
ecutives no longer complain that lawyers add no value towards a trans-
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action.74 When clients choose to hire lawyers, it’s precisely because of the
significant value they do add.
Despite the dramatic increase in public confidence in the bar, some
hostility to lawyers continues. Far too many members of the public con-
tinue to reject the fundamental moral principle that every person is en-
titled to representation. They believe that in every dispute only one side
is right and deserving of a lawyer’s assistance. Discarding professional-
ism has forced us to articulate our moral vision with more clarity, but,
nonetheless, some remain unconvinced.
We have other challenges before us as well. We still have not fully re-
solved the problem of providing services to those too poor to afford even
the lower prices presently available. Despite our lack of success thus far,
we must not give up on trying to realize more fully the goal of equal jus-
tice under law.
This failing reminds us that we should not be smug or self-righteous
about the tremendous strides we have made since the turn of the cen-
tury. Although we have discarded the ideology of professionalism, we
must continue to respect the tradition of our predecessors who employed
professionalism to promote the common good.
On this occasion, I would particularly like to honor the memory of
Justice Louis D. Brandeis.  Although an exponent of professionalism, he
rejected the distinction between a business and a profession and as-
serted that business should join the elite ranks of the learned profes-
sions.75 We at the bar today have come to a similar conclusion based on a
different rationale.  We have discarded professionalism in favor of the
understanding that all people, whether in the elite or not, share respon-
sibility for the public good in whatever work they do.76 The work of the
bar involves the administration of justice and the preservation of order.
This places a great responsibility upon us.  On this Law Day 2050, let us
rededicate ourselves to promoting justice through our work and let us
keep in mind words Louis Brandeis wrote almost 150 years ago: “There
is a call upon the [bar] to do a great work for this country.”77
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